The article investigates the relationship between ownership structure and the role played by the board of directors in the strategic decision process. A comparative case study of strategic decision processes indicates that ownership concentration, the nature of shareholders' interests and the distribution of relevant knowledge affect the key functions performed by the board of directors, the involvement of the board in the different phases of the strategic decision process, and the most adopted decision mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
Researchers in the corporate governance field have rarely considered ownership structure as a relevant antecedent of board dynamics and strategic decision-making or as a moderating variable between board characteristics and financial performance. Even when ownership structure has been introduced in the analysis, it has been done in a somewhat simplified way. Some researchers (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, Tosi & Hinkin, 1987; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995) , for instance, distinguished simply between externally-controlled firms (which have at least one major shareholder who is not a manager) and internally-controlled firms (in which no single shareholder owns a significant share), leaving out of the analysis other possible configurations. Other researchers focused on measurable dimensions, such as ownership concentration (e.g. Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991; Hill & Snell, 1988) , thus reducing the intrinsic complexity of the concept, while at the same time increasing the room for a subjective interpretation of the results, according to the adopted theoretical framework (Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998) . Such simplifications found justification both in the dominant theoretical approach and research method in the corporate governance field; namely, agency theory and correlational research based on demographic variables. Recent reviews of past research, however, have revealed that the search for direct relationships between demographic variables and measures of outcome has produced mixed results (Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996) . These findings have led researchers to conclude that, in order to improve our understanding of board dynamics, we need to explore processes and mechanisms that underlie board dynamics (Pettigrew, 1992) , to include variables of different nature in our studies (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) , and to consider alternative theoretical frameworks (Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1999) . In the present article, we report the findings from a comparative case study on the influence of ownership structure on board's functions and strategic decision-making that rests on different theoretical and methodological assumptions than mainstream research on board of directors. First, we consider ownership structure as a multidimensional concept that comprises both quantitative and qualitative aspects. As other researchers have argued before (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992) , if we study the impact of ownership structure on board dynamics and strategic decision-making only in quantitative terms, we may neglect the influence of non-measurable variables of political, behavioral or cognitive nature. Second, we argue that, although agency theory provides a powerful theoretical framework for analyzing governance issues in large American corporations, where the actual configuration of the interests of the actors involved is consistent with the assumptions of the model, it is less useful for a variety of ownership structures (consortia, coalitions, family-owned firms, co-operatives etc.) that are less diffused in the North American context, but abound in other business systems (Charkham, 1994; Clegg & Redding, 1990; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1997; Whitley, 1992) . Henceforth, we started our study with no a priori frame of reference, but we adopted an inductive approach and we let theory emerge from data.
Our findings offer initial empirical evidence that ownership concentration and the configuration of shareholders' interests influence some aspects of the functioning of the board, namely (i) the key functions performed by the board of directors, (ii) the involvement of the board in the strategic decision process, and (iii) the prevailing decisionmaking mechanisms. Empirical evidence suggests also that an alternative theoretical framework based on the recognition of the essentially political nature of strategic and governance processes (Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory & Wilson, 1986; Pettigrew, 1973) provides a more powerful conceptual framework for the analysis of organizations with a complex ownership structure than the dominant agency theory. This article is composed of six sections. In the first section, we critique the dominant theoretical and methodological approaches to corporate governance studies. Then, we present our research method and we discuss the reasons for the adoption of a processual approach based on qualitative tools for data collection and analysis. In the following sections, we present our findings and relate them to an alternative perspective for the study of governance issues. In the final section, we discuss limitations and directions for future research.
A CRITIQUE OF THE DOMINANT APPROACH IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FIELD
Recently, a careful review and meta-analysis of the extant research in one of the major areas of inquiry in the field of corporate governance -the relationship between board composition, board leadership structure, and firm financial performance -revealed little consistency in past results (Dalton et al., 1998) . Even the inclusion of moderating variables such as firm size or the nature of the indicators of financial performance, and various operationalizations of board composition did not lead to any significant evidence of systematic governance structure/financial performance relationship. Later, Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998) questioned the validity of Amihud and Lev's (1981) study, which is widely cited as a major empirical support for the agency framework. After having analyzed two different sets of data -the original Amihud and Lev's from the 1960s and their own data from the 1980s -Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin found no evidence of Amihud and Lev's conclusion that corporate diversification is higher in managementcontrolled firms, where manager's decisions are not restricted by large block shareholders. On the basis of their findings, the authors of the study argued that the fundamental assumptions of agency theory have little relevance in explaining the strategic behaviors of public corporations in ordinary situations, in which managers are not under siege nor their interests clearly conflict with those of the shareholders.
These results give us reasons to question the capacity of the traditional approach alone to cope with the complexity of the phenomenon, and suggest that the corporate governance field would benefit from an intensification of studies adopting competing explanatory frameworks and perspectives. Corporate governance studies, in fact, have been for the last decade in a "normal science" phase (Kuhn, 1970) . The pioneering study of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932) set the boundaries of the field, revealing the increasing separation of ownership and control in large American corporations. Years later, the consequences of this phenomenon were analyzed by economists that showed how diverging utility functions of managers and shareholders had a serious influence on firms' goals and conduct (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964) . Managerial economics laid the foundation of a conceptual framework that was later developed by agency theorist (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and became the main theoretical reference of governance studies. A promising perspective -i.e. resource dependence ( Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) -was gradually left aside, along with the strategic and environmental contingencies (company life cycle, environmental hostility, etc.) that formed its main object of inquiry. Occasionally, propositions built on agency theory have been compared with alternative propositions derived from competing schools of thought such as institutional theory (e.g. Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) , impression management (e.g. Zajac & Westphal, 1995) or social movement theory (Davis & Thompson, 1994) . Empirical research within the corporate governance field, however, has been largely dedicated to testing hypotheses built on the dominating economic paradigm. This approach has led to a considerable body of high quality empirical studies, conducted on large samples and with rigorous methods for data collection and analysis. The metaanalysis carried out by Dalton and colleagues, however, seems to indicate that although the dominant approach in corporate governance research may have led to internally valid results for each separate study, these separate studies have limited external generalizability. It is our opinion that the reasons could be related to the nature of the approach itself. In fact, the adoption of a "normal science" method, based on the deductive development of hypotheses and subsequent verification through correlational research, has induced many scholars in the corporate governance field to give priority to the measurability of variables and the availability of quantitative data and to reduce complex constructs like ownership structure to simple measures or types, in order to fit the requirements of the research method. An explanation of Dalton and colleagues' findings could be related, therefore, to the high number of variables that affects governance processes and determines variation in results across studies. Furthermore, a core assumption of agency theory -i.e. the direct impact of contractual arrangements and control structures on the firm's efficiency -has led researchers to look for a direct relationship between variables such as compensation mechanisms, board composition or leadership structure, and a variety of outcomes expressive of a company's performance. This tendency has led researchers to overlook important factors impacting on corporate governance processes, merely because they could not easily be operationalized and measured in quantitative terms. In this respect, an "excess" of rigor, parsimony and simplicity may have led to a tendency to simplify the causal chain linking governance structures and dynamics to corporate performance and have reduced the ability of the research method to detect the influence of variables not considered in the design phase (Forbes & Milliken, 1996; Pettigrew, 1992) . In this respect, a "revolutionary" phase could be beneficial to governance studies, helping researchers to overcome shortcomings associated with the normal science approach. Agency theory offered powerful conceptual and analytical tools to investigate governance issues, yet, as Dalton and colleagues' meta-analysis seems to suggest, there are likely to be areas that agency theory is not able to explain equally well. Opening up the corporate governance field to new theoretical contributions may offer alternative and more convincing explanations for observed phenomena. New paradigms may emerge that could account for inconsistencies in past results. A paradigm shift, though, requires almost inevitably a phase of inductive empirical research and grounded theory-building that frees researchers from the conditioning of old interpretive schemes.
RESEARCH METHOD
The application of agency theory to the study of governance issues is based on the implicit fundamental assumption of the existence of a principal, the owners, represented by the board, and an agent, the top management, whose goals are divergent. Even when the ownership of the company is distributed among different actors, it is assumed that they all share the same goal -i.e. maximization of the shareholders' value -so that the board can safely be assumed to act on behalf of a single entity. As most research on corporate governance is carried out on large public companies, these assumptions are consistent with the characteristics of the unit of analysis. The adoption of a pure agency perspective, though, may be less appropriate to the study of board functioning in companies with a more complex ownership structure, such as those with a low number of shareholders, none of whom holds the majority of the capital and whose interests are partially in conflict with one another. This is the case, for instance, of most joint ventures and consortiums, where shareholders of the company are often customers, suppliers or even competitors at the same time. This is also the case of several European firms whose capital is distributed among shareholders with different interests, time orientation and involvement in the business, as is the case with entrepreneurs, banks, commercial or industrial partners, governmental agencies, institutional investors and minority shareholders (Thomsen & Pedersen, 1997) . In all these cases, the study of board dynamics, with specific reference to the strategic decision-making process, may require a different approach. As the basic assumptions of agency theory do not seem to fit, at least at a theoretical level, we moved a step back and, instead of testing propositions deducted from theory, we let variables and relations relevant to the different organizational setting emerge from the data. Given the nature and purpose of our inquiry, we relied on theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) . We focused on those firms whose ownership is distributed between a few actors, none of whom controls the majority of the votes, and at least some of whom have other interests than profit alone. Cases were selected from a proprietary archive containing financial, institutional and organizational data on the 500 largest Italian companies and corporate business groups. The archive has been built by the authors in the course of a research project funded by Assolombarda -a prominent regional industry associationwith the purpose of monitoring trends in competitive and institutional dynamics in large Italian firms. Part of the information contained in the archive comes from secondary sources such as company directories and business magazines. The authors have collected other data through questionnaires and interviews. Data contained in the archive permit us to assess the relative diffusion of different corporate forms among large and medium sized Italian firms. By the term "corporate forms", we refer to distinctive configurations of ownership structure: differences between corporate forms are related to the legal form (corporate, cooperative etc.), the nature of owners (institutional investors, other firms, managers, employees, the State, etc.) and their presumed fundamental goals, the relative distribution of shares etc.
Among the largest 500 companies in 1997, 16 conformed to our requirements. We excluded those coalitions whose members are tied by family bonds or interlocking participation -a common mechanisms for safeguarding corporate control in large Italian family businesses -because there is ample evidence that the specificity of the governance processes of these forms deserves separate investigation ( Brioschi, Buzzacchi & Colombo, 1990) . We contacted all the firms that conformed to our requirements and 10 out of 16 agreed to participate in our research. Considering the nature of the inquiry, we consider this percentage satisfactory. Their sales varied roughly between 200.000 and 3.900.000 million Italian liras. Employees varied between 800 and 15.900. For sake of confidentiality, their names have been disguised. More details are reported in table 1.
For each company, data were collected from three different sources. First we conducted a preliminary archival research in business magazines and other secondary sources, with the aim of drawing a company profile and of tracing the company's recent history. Then we collected copies of the company by-laws and agreements between shareholders from the local Chambers of Commerce. These documents offered us a complete representation of the formal "rules of the game" that framed board dynamics and decision-making processes. The analysis of company histories and profiles helped us to prepare a semi-structured interview, aimed at collecting information on the board's functions and its role in strategic decision-making.
For most companies we interviewed at least two members of the board -usually the chairman and the CEO (see table 1). We selected the informants so that we could hear the voice and the perspective of different actors, and thus obtain a less biased representation of board dynamics. We began the interviews by asking our informants to give us a brief description of their company, their industry and their competitive strategy. Even if we already possessed data on the ownership structure, we asked them for a confirmation; we also asked our informants if any of the owners had other relationships with the company besides shareholdings -i. e. supply of technology or raw materials, competition, etc. Our aim was to obtain a clearer representation of each shareholder's interests in corporate activity and performance. A detailed analysis of the ownership pattern revealed that our sample was indeed composed by two different groups. In three cases, stocks were distributed between managers and investors of different nature (merchant banks, institutional investors etc.); in one of these cases, a large client was present with a minority share, but it was not represented in the board. The other seven firms were joint ventures: in six cases stocks were divided equally between two partners, in the seventh, three partners were present, none of which, however, held the majority (forty-forty-twenty). At the time of the research, none of the companies was listed. For sake of simplicity, from now on we will refer to the first group simply as "mixed-coalitions" and to the second as "joint ventures". In the second part of the interview, we focused on board composition and functioning. We asked extensive information about board members: their number, their relationships with shareholders or managers, their competencies, the reasons for their inclusion in the board, their specific contribution to board activity. We also asked information about the frequency and organization of board meetings, and the existence of committees. Informants were also asked to give a general description of the activity during the meetings and an evaluation of the contribution of the board to the strategic decision-making process. We showed our informants a general list of potential activities, leaving them free to modify it according to their experience -and we asked a broad estimate of time dedicated by the board as a whole to each activity. The final list included: evaluation of financial operations, evaluation of capital investments, definition of goals and general policies, definition of competitive strategies, control of strategy implementation, evaluation of financial results, evaluation of managerial performance, selection and reward of management, relationship with external actors (banks, unions, national and local authorities etc.). The third part of the interview was aimed at investigating the strategic decision process. Following a method already used in research on decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989b) , for each firm we asked our informants to identify a recent major decision that had involved the board and could be considered representative of the usual process by which strategic decisions are made. Following a common approach in research on strategic decision making (Hickson et al., 1986; Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Théorèt, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989b) we defined as strategic a complex, non-routinary decision, that is "important, in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set" (Mintzberg et. al., 1976: 246) . The content of analyzed decisions varied from the construction of a production facility, to the sales or the acquisition of a company, and other forms of capital investment (see table 1 ). Nine out of ten decisions involved investments ranging between 5% and 20% of the total assets. We asked our informants to trace the story of the decision, trying to distinguish facts (how it started, who was involved etc.) from personal observations. Both researchers were present at all the interviews. Given the content of the interview, we were rarely allowed to use a tape-recorder. Detailed notes were collected and, soon after each interview, they were compared, merged and transcribed. Data analysis used common methods for grounded theory building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989a) . First, we compared our findings with the results of past research conducted on different samples of firms, within the same business system. We observed a substantial difference, that seemed to support the general proposition that ownership structure influences board structure and dynamics, and therefore different corporate forms may require different explanatory frameworks. Then, we combined within-case analysis with cross-case comparison to identify variables that could explain differences in the observed behavior. Within-case analysis, based on rich, often anecdotal, information led to insights that were further developed and tested in cross case analysis. We relied on comparative tables to detect similarities and differences, and to identify discriminating variables. Provisional interpretations and tentative propositions were refined in several iterations between theory and data. Following Eisenhardt's (1989a) indications, we referred to the existing literature to develop and enrich inductively derived theoretical insights.
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND BOARD INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGY MAKING
In Italy, previous studies on board composition and board involvement in the governance process invariably reported a discouraging picture (see table 2): evidence seems to indicate that in Italian companies board meetings are infrequent and they are not carefully planned in advance, outside directors play a marginal role, managers provide little information to the directors and executive committees tend to absorb all the functions of the board (Barca et al., 1994; Crisci & Tarizzo, 1994; Corbetta & Tomaselli, 1996) .
Our findings, summarized in table 3, draw quite a different picture. The boards of the observed companies were composed, on average, by eight members and they met on average five-six times per year. In seven cases out of ten no executive committee was present. The information given to the directors was usually judged comprehensive and timely. Most of all, many of our informants spontaneously described the role of the board as "substantial", "decisional" or "fundamental". One of them referred to the board as "the place where the real decisions are made".
Given that past studies were conducted within the same institutional context and national culture and approximately around the same period -mid nineties -, and given that there is no evidence that the average size and the mix of industries differ significantly, we concluded that the most plausible explanation for these differences involves the influence of the ownership structure, and, in particular of ownership concentration. Italian firms of any size, in fact, are characterized by a high concentration of shares in the hands of major shareholders who are at the same time owners and managers (family-owned firms, entrepreneurial firms, etc.) (Barca et al. 1994) . Unlike the large American corporations that served as a model for agency theorists, in most Italian firms, ownership, control, and often even management coincide; the majority of directors are in fact also shareholders with a managerial role inside the firm (Corbetta & Tomaselli, 1996) . In this case, the board of directors tend to lose its main function of monitoring managerial behavior and performance, regular and comprehensive information from the managers is less important, and board meetings could be held when required by the law or by the situation. In family-owned firms, for instance, blood ties connect major shareholders. The board of directors tends to be composed of family members, although occasionally the controlling family may appoint external members who bring particular competencies not possessed by family members. In these firms the effectiveness of the board as a governance body is largely determined by the orientation of the owning family: some boards really participate to the company's life, while others are created only to comply with the law. In general, boards of family-owned firms perform mainly an advisory function, because strategic alternatives are usually developed and selected by the entrepreneur (occasionally relying on the help of professionals on specific matters such as commercial law, tax law, financial issues etc.) while the coincidence between managers and shareholders makes the control function irrelevant (Danco & Jonovic, 1981; Ward & Handy, 1988) . As ownership concentration decreases and -as in the companies that we observed -reaches a point where no individual shareholder holds the majority of the votes, however, any decision necessarily has to take into account a wider range of interests and is therefore subject to collective approval. The board of directors becomes a real decision making body where each shareholder, who is able to do so, elects his or her representative(s) -hence the larger number of directors. Consequently, the board needs to meet more frequently and meetings last longer. Also it acquires the power and the will to demand more timely and comprehensive information from the management. In formal terms,
Proposition 1: The involvement of the board in strategic decisions increases if ownership is distributed among different actors, none of whom controls the majority of the votes.
This interpretation found further support in cross-case comparison. Although results did not differ much across nine of the ten companies, joint venture Lambda, as evidenced in table 2, shown a completely different pattern: a board composed by five directors (the managing director and four representatives of the parent companies) met only three times a year, for one to two hours, mainly to fulfil the legal duties. This company was, in fact, the branch of a multinational joint venture. Although stocks were equally distributed between an Italian company and a foreign multinational, the Italian company was actually part of a larger organization, whose headquarters were located in another European country. In many respects, then, the Italian company acted as a subsidiary and although ownership was formally split between the two partners, the managing director had only one counterparti.e. his functional boss at the headquarters.
KNOWLEDGE, INTERESTS AND THE ALLOCATION OF THE PHASES OF DECISION
Past research in the governance field has explored the effects of board and ownership structure on strategy making mainly in terms of the risk profile of corporate strategies. Some studies have investigated the relationship between related and unrelated diversification and the degree of management stock ownership (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1999; Lane et al., 1998) . As Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1999) pointed out, however, the different theoretical frameworks guiding researchers' methodological choices and interpretation of results have produced contrasting results.
Other studies have investigated the commonly held assumption that managers are reluctant to invest in innovative projects that yield long-term returns and have a high failure rate, while stockholders, being able to reduce the risk through portfolio diversification (Hay & Morris, 1979) , appreciate high risk-high return strategies. Several studies (e.g. Hill & Snell, 1988; Graves, 1988; Baysinger et al., 1991) have investigated the correlation between ownership concentration -as a proxy of shareholders' power -and the presence of institutional investors, and the allocation of resources to long-term research projects -measured as corporate R&D spending. Although also these studies have produced mixed results, they seem to agree on the positive effect that institutional ownership has on capital investments in long-term R&D projects. In this respect, these studies offer first evidence on the relationship between the interests represented in the board and the strategic conduct of the firm. Microeconomic models have helped to investigate simple situations, where a specific interest -either the managers' or the investors' -could prevail and where conflict was expressed only in terms of risk aversion.
The cases that we observed presented a more complex picture. If we exclude the case of Lambda, whose particular condition has been discussed in the previous section, in all the other cases, the board -either collectively or through the executive committee or through individual members -was actively involved in the strategic decision-making process. All our informants reported frequent interaction between board members and managers all along the process. The extent of the involvement differed, though, as far as the phases of the process and the content of the decisions were concerned. Overall, two patterns emerged. In three cases, mixed coalitions Tecna, Mercury and Transco, the board only set quantitative objectives (in terms of growth, profitability etc.), leaving all the responsibility for strategy-making to the managers. Strategic issues originated from and were brought to the attention of the board by the top managers. Although most directors were kept constantly informed about the emerging alternatives that would later be submitted to the attention of the board, they were developed and elaborated exclusively by the managers. Two coalitions out of three had created executive committees composed of managers and representatives of major shareholders, who were vested with a broad responsibility. The executive committees' main functions, however, were to monitor more closely the executives' activity, to develop a deeper understanding of the business and the strategic alternatives, and to collect detailed information that would subsequently circulated among the other directors. Incidentally, it is worth noting that the only board of a mixed-coalition, that had not created such a committee, was by far the one that met more frequently (12 times a year, against an average of 5-6) and for the longest time (approximately four hours for each meeting). Periodically, strategic issues were discussed and decisions were taken during board meetings, on the basis of the detailed information provided for by the management. Decisions were later implemented by the managers, and their results again brought to the attention of the committee. In all the other cases, the six joint ventures, the involvement of the board was much greater. Most joint ventures, in fact, were governed by boards of directors where each firm elected an equal amount of directors. In two cases, Axis and Dualtel, an impartial chairman was also elected -both persons were considered super partes because of their personal history, professional competencies and ethical values. Most representatives of the partners were either people with experience in the business -functional managers in the mother companies, managing directors in sister companies, or sometimes ex-managers -or "observers", as the chairman of Toner defined them, on behalf of the mother companies (see table 4 ). In nearly all the cases, high officers from the mother companies, sometimes even the CEOs, sat in the board. Decisions were often initiated by external (non managers) members of the board. The board itself contributed to the formulation of the strategic alternatives, giving inputs and using board's representatives to steer the process. In all cases, the board took formal responsibility for the choice of the alternatives proposed by the management, although decisions had been taken to board's meeting only after directors had reached an agreement among them. Later, individual members of the board often supported managers in the implementation of the decisions.
The first pattern is consistent with what agency theorists Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen (1983) argued at the theoretical level. Fama and Jensen distinguished two fundamental functions in the strategic decision process: "decision management", which includes the generation of strategic alternatives for resource utilization and the execution of the decision, and "decision control", which includes the selection of the course of conduct and the control of the performance. According to Fama and Jensen, the ownership structure influences the allocation of the steps of the decision-making process between the board of directors and the managers, as in presence of a separation between ownership and control, the first function is performed by the managers while the second is performed by the board representing the shareholders. If this condition were sufficient to determine the allocation of the phases of the strategic process, though, we should have observed the same pattern in all our cases. On the contrary, in six cases out of nine, steps allocation was not as well defined: the board, either collectively or through some of its members, was directly involved in the generation and elaboration of strategic alternatives and sometimes even in their implementation. Rather than choosing between different alternatives proposed by the managers, then, the board took an active part in their development, so that the generation phase and the selection phase were actually intertwined.
One of the reasons for this difference seems to be related to the distribution of critical knowledge among the actors involved, because of their professional background or their past experience (see table 4 ).
In the case of mixed coalitions, outside directors were for the most part representatives of institutional investors, whose knowledge of the business and potential contribution to strategy formulation was low. Their involvement in the process was limited to reviewing plans, probing for more information, and stimulating their refinement. In most joint ventures, though, shareholders (mother companies) could contribute with specific technological and managerial knowledge to the strategic process. Some members of the board were also functional managers in the mother companies and could play a broader role in the decision-management phases. At Digital, for instance, a member of the board, also a manager in a major merchant bank, provided his personal expertise and connections to strengthen the financial side of the plan. At Toner, a producer of office machines, members of the board provided technological expertise and acted as advocates of the venture to both mother companies, in order to guarantee technical compatibility and to secure operational and commercial support. At Alpine, the acquisition of a new production facility was evaluated by a task force, which included the general manager of the company and two members of the board whose respective competencies were relevant to the decision. In formal terms, then: Proposition 2: The greater the amount of related knowledge possessed by the members of the board, the higher the involvement of the board in decision management.
Another variable, whose discriminating effect seems to be even stronger, though, is related to another aspect of the ownership structure: what we can call the heterogeneity of shareholders' interests. Although, by definition, all shareholders share a common interest in the long term maximization of net income, in some cases their interests may diverge. As shown in table 3, in all the joint ventures a structural conflict of interest was present, because of the exchange relationships that at least one of the partners had with the company, as a supplier of technology, raw materials, know-how etc. As a member of the board of Digital said, for instance, "conflict did not appear in the minutes, but was in the atmosphere and it was due to diverging interests among shareholders. One of them had developed a proprietary technology and found itself in a double position, as supplier and client." In another case, Dualtel, conflict was heightened because the mother companies were also in a competing position: "At times" -one of the interviewed told us -"frictions arise between the two partners, because for certain product lines the venture competes with one of the mother companies on foreign markets." As past studies (e.g. Hickson et al., 1986; Pettigrew, 1973) have shown, in fact, strategic decisions in organizations are not just about solving technical or economic problems following criteria of efficiency. As long as they imply an allocation of resources, they also have to accommodate multiple interests about the use of those resources. The various interests involved, in fact, shape strategic decisions, insofar as they find a formal or informal way to exert influence on the decision process. In this sense, representation in the board of directors is one of the most effective ways of influencing the outcome of the decision process. At Dualtel, a telecommunications company, for instance, parent companies had opposing views on locating the manufacturing of a new product. Both companies had interests in the production being carried out within their own facilities. In these cases, then, the board acted mainly as a negotiation forum, where a compromise between the diverging interests of partners had to be reached even on relatively "minor" details. In mixed coalitions, instead, the pattern of conflict was simpler and closer to the traditional representation: the managers -even if they hold a share in the company stocks -on one side and the shareholders on the other. The conflict of interests was therefore easier to solve, also given that external shareholders usually held the majority of votes. This can explain why in these companies decisions could be taken in board meetings. Only in one coalition out of three, the relatively high share controlled by the managers gave them such power that keeping the other directors informed about the decision-making process was sufficient to obtain the ratification of the decision from the board during the meeting. In formal terms, Proposition 3: The higher the heterogeneity of shareholders' interests, the higher the involvement of the board in decision management.
INTERESTS, BOARD REGULATION AND THE MECHANISMS OF DECISION
Building on earlier frameworks (March & Simon, 1958; Thompson & Tuden, 1959) Mintzberg and colleagues (1976, p. 258) have identified three basic modes for choosing among alternatives: judgement, analysis and bargaining. Judgement refers to decisions made by individuals in their own mind, on the basis of a subjective evaluation of the consequences and following procedures that they do not explain. Analysis, on the contrary, is based on a rational and objective evaluation of the alternatives, supported by factual data and technical tools. Bargaining, finally, produces decisions that are the result of mediation between the interests of different parties with conflicting goals; in this case the solution is affected by the bargaining power and the ability of the actors involved. The analysis of the cases suggests that the configuration of shareholders' interests may affect also the mechanisms used to select the different alternatives elaborated by top managers. In three joint ventures, Dualtel, Axis and Digital, when asked to describe the decision process, our informants explicitly referred to the necessity to reach a consensus between the shareholders before a decision was made. In these cases, strategic decisions were discussed between shareholders' representatives in the board even outside meeting, and brought to a meeting only after an agreement was reached. When the board met, then, directors had already discussed the issue and a consensus had been reached, so that decisions were unanimous. The fact that high officers from the mother companies sat in the board, as the managing directors of Dualtel and Axis observed, gave the board the possibility to make important decisions that affected the interests of the partners. In mixed coalitions, on the contrary, the "rational" aspects were prevalent: plans were submitted in advance to the board, whose members analyzed and discussed them with the managers and, at times, requested modifications or even rejected the plan if the technical solutions were not convincing or if the financial implications were unsatisfactory. Again, this difference could be explained referring to the different structure of interests converging on the firm. Pure shareholders' interests are related to the maximization of the residual value produced by the firm. In this respect, no conflict of interests should arise between investor shareholders represented in the board. Indeed, it could be argued that an "implicit" process of bargaining is conducted also between the managers and the representatives of the investors. Commonality of interests between the investors, though, makes it possible for a coalition of investor-shareholders to veto managers' decision, whose adequacy, then, have to be proven on technical grounds. In the case of joint ventures, however, the heterogeneity of shareholders' interests and the complexity of the relationships with the venture make it difficult to identify simple criteria for evaluating the outcome of the decision. Decisions necessarily follow a political rationality: consensus on each and every issue is searched for and reached on different grounds. In formal terms:
Proposition 4a. Other things being equal, a high heterogeneity of interests among the shareholders should lead to negotiation as a prevailing decision mode. Proposition 4b. Other things being equal, a low heterogeneity of interests among shareholders should lead to analysis as a prevailing decision mode.
At first, the fact that the other three joint ventures, Europol, Toner and Alpine, shown a behavior similar to the mixed coalitions' -i.e. formal plans submitted to the revision and analytical evaluation of the members of the board -seemed to contradict our proposition. Yet further analysis revealed a substantial difference between the shareholders agreements of the first and the second group. In these three cases, ample amendments to the by-laws (Europol) and other venture agreements (Toner and Alpine) between the partners regulated in details the supply relationships and any other potential conflict of interests (see table 5 ). This regulation, then, offered a solid framework in the light of which managers' proposals could be evaluated. A simpler configuration of conflicting interests or the possibility to reduce uncertainties through an extensive regulation of the relationships, then, seem to reduce the necessary involvement of the board in the "political" aspects of decisionmaking. Shareholders' of other joint ventures, instead, seemed to leave the resolution of their diverging interests mainly to the negotiations between board members. Accordingly, in two cases, the only amendments to the by-laws regarded the election of shareholders' representatives, so that fair and equal representation were guaranteed to all the parties involved. Although heterogeneity of interests among shareholders seemed to have an important discriminating impact on the mechanisms of decision, then, another variable seemed to play a moderating role: the extent of board regulation.
Corollary 4. Other things being equal, an extensive regulation of relationships among shareholders and between them and the company reduces room for bargaining and lead to analysis as a prevailing mechanism for decision.

PATTERNS OF BOARD ACTIVITY: THE BOARD AS A DECISION FORUM
Management scholars (Zhara & Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1997) tend to agree that the most significant functions performed by the board in the strategy making-process are related to the monitoring of managers' behavior in order to protect shareholders' interests, the revision and evaluation of strategic decisions, the facilitation of the acquisition of information and resources critical to firm's success. Monitoring managerial performance is considered the first and foremost function of the board. Agency theorists (Fama & Jensen, 1983 ), as we have said before, consider the board of directors one of the fundamental mechanisms for safeguarding shareholders' interests from opportunistic behavior of executives. Other scholars (e.g. Andrews, 1980; Lorsch, 1995; Lorsch & McIver, 1989) have stressed the important role of the board in the strategy-making process. Kenneth Andrews (1980) , for instance, suggested that directors could contribute to refine corporate strategy, by evaluating corporate plans and challenging managers. Directors, though, sometimes can be actively involved in suggesting alternatives and bringing specific expertise and knowledge to the process. Others (i.e Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) , finally, have pointed at the important function of improving the capacity of the firm to collect resources from the environment, either through the co-optation of representatives of critical resourceholders or a contribution to the firm's legitimacy in the eyes of external constituents. Evidence from our study indicates a fourth function that seems to have been overlooked in past studies and is related to the resolution of conflict of interests between represented shareholders. The adoption of agency theory as the main theoretical reference for corporate governance studies led researchers to represent board dynamics as an ongoing struggle between two homogenous and opposing interests: those of the managers and those of the shareholders. In this respect, the function of the board was seen essentially as monitoring managers' behavior and safeguarding shareholders' interests. Yet, as we have seen, the configuration of interests around the firm may be much more complex, as was especially the case of the joint ventures we observed. In these cases, the main function of the board becomes the reconcilement of conflicting interests regarding strategic directions. The board of directors, then, is the place where shareholders' representatives define a common set of goals and guidelines that should guide managerial action. Also, the board of directors intervenes in the strategy-making process, dealing directly with decisions that affect diverging shareholders interests. The cross-analysis of prevailing board activities of the observed companies showed evidence of a relationship between the main functions performed by the board and different structural and environmental variables. For each company, table 5 reports all the activities to which, according to our informants, the board as a collective entity dedicates more than one fifth of its time. For all the observed companies the control of financial results ranked first or second; this is not surprising, though, since control of financial performance is an intrinsic function of the board as such. The analysis of the activities that were ranked immediately below, however, suggests the existence of distinctive configurations of board activity and structures. These configurations reflect conscious choices and emerging social processes that lead the board to play different roles. In six cases out of ten, boards in plenary sessions engaged in a sort of "gatekeeping" role. These boards had mainly a function of making sure that strategic decisions were consistent with shareholders' interests. Executive committees or boards' delegates, securing a flow of information about current activities and strategic plans, kept directors informed about the firm conduct. In board meetings, most of the time was dedicated to the analysis of financial results and the evaluation of managerial performance. One third of the time, on average, was dedicated to discuss and approve -or reject -strategic plans or investment opportunities formulated and proposed by the managers. Meetings were less frequent and shorter. Strategies were largely defined by top managers, at times with the support of individual board members. In two other cases, shareholders preferred to directly vest the board with the responsibility to accommodate conflicting interests and to give managers broad strategic directions. These boards performed a truly "strategic" role: strategic in the twofold sense of reconciling diverging interests on the allocation of resources and contributing to the definition of overall goals and the formation of a competitive course of action. The board, in fact, did not restrict itself to set general goals, but went deeper down the hierarchy of strategic decisions, by delineating the mission of the firm, defining general guidelines and sometimes even having a word in the development of business strategies. The function of the board was performed largely outside the plenary sessions. Important decisions were discussed in informal meetings where shareholders' representatives bargained over different strategic alternatives and found an accommodation of their respective interests. Still, in board meetings, around half of the time was dedicated to the discussion and definition of overall policies and competitive moves.
The first group was composed by the three mixed coalitions and by joint ventures Europol, Toner and Alpine. The second group was composed by joint ventures Axis and Dualtone. Again, the observed behavior could be explained by the combined influence of the heterogeneity of interests and the extent of board regulation. For companies belonging to the first group, in fact, either heterogeneity of shareholders' interests was low (mixed-coalitions) or the relationships between the shareholders and the company were extensively regulated, so that conflict of interests found resolution in the contractual agreements.
In the remaining two cases, a third role-type emerged, reflecting a peculiarity in the ownership structure, in one case, and the task environment, in the second. Besides the usual function of controlling financial performance, the board activity was largely dedicated, both collectively and individually, to manage the relationships between external constituents. We found, however, different explanations for the two cases. In one case, we refer to the branch of a multinational joint venture, whose operating conditions and degrees of freedom were actually closer to those of a subsidiary, and the strategic issues brought to the attention of the board were of local or operative interest. Some issues, such as industrial relations or regulations, had to be dealt with at the local level. Accordingly, although the local board did not take part into the definition of corporate and business strategies, its main function was to manage the relationships in the national environment in order to facilitate the realization of the strategy developed by the headquarters. In this sense, then, the board still played an "institutional" role. On one hand, the local board actively managed institutional relationship with national authorities, trade unions, local competitors etc. On the other, it dealt with all the issues related to the specificity of the institutional environment in terms of regulation of wastes, recycling, safety etc. This finding is consistent with the functions of the boards of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises, as described by Leksell and Lindgren (1982) . The other company, Digital, a commercial television broadcaster, was operating in a highly regulated environment in a time of transition: managing relationships with political parties, state officials, governmental agencies, the press etc. was of capital importance both to influence and to anticipate changes in the institutional environment. In this case, a combination of high heterogeneity of interests and highly institutionalized task environment led the board to perform a double function. A settlement between the diverging interests of the parties was reached mainly outside the meetings, in an ongoing negotiation between shareholders' representatives. Meetings were mostly dedicated to discuss issues related to institutional relationships and to manage the connections and the information flow with the institutional actors; a few members of the board, indeed, had been elected because of the contribution that they could provide with this regard.
CONCLUSIONS
As recent reviews indicate, past research on core issues in the governance field -i.e. the relationship between board composition, leadership structure and financial performance -has produced results of little consistency (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1996) . In this paper, we have argued that this conclusion could be related to the theoretical framework and the research method that have guided most corporate governance research in the last decade. In our opinion, these results indicate that the causal link between governance structures and financial performance has not been properly represented and explored. As Mayer Zald, an early investigator of boards' functioning, observed, purely quantitative measurement may not provide adequate account of board dynamics:
Boards of directors are hard to study. Often they conduct the business in secret; their members are busy people; the processes themselves are sometimes most effectively described by novelists. Nevertheless, study is possible, and pieces of evidence can be brought to bear (Zald, 1969: 110). We argue that the adoption of a conceptual framework based on agency theory and a research method based on correlational research led researchers to an oversimplification of the phenomena, overlooking important variables and social dynamics. Moreover most studies focus on large American corporation and, for this reason, tend to neglect some important subjects and processes of corporate governance that are more evident in corporate forms developed in other national contexts. For this reason we designed a research project that allow us to open the black box of agency theory with the aim of analysing the microprocesses that connect ownership structure, board dynamics and strategic choices. Our analysis supports the assumption that the structure and the composition of the ownership can exert a substantial influence on board dynamics and, through these, on strategic choices and performance (see figure 1) .
Our findings suggest that ownership structure is a multidimensional concept that cannot be measured only in terms of ownership concentration, but it should also consider the heterogeneity of shareholders' interests and the distribution of critical knowledge among them. Moreover they show that ownership structure exert a strong influence on board dynamics, i.e. the key functions performed by the board of directors, the board involvement in the strategic decision process and the prevailing decision mode used during board meetings.
The analysis of board activity in the observed corporate forms has revealed that, in presence of highly diverging interest among the shareholders, the board served mainly as a negotiation forum, where an agreement of common goals and directions is reached. The board does not act only to safeguard shareholders' interests from managers' abuse, but is indeed the body where these common interests are defined. Managers' proposals, then, are evaluated not only in terms of their technical rationality and financial viability: the impact of the proposed courses of action on different owners' interests dominates the process. As a consequence, decision making in presence of high heterogeneity of interests seems to be based more on bargaining than rational analysis or judgement and intuition. The influence of heterogeneity of interests, however, seems to be moderated by the extent of regulation of board activity: if heterogeneity of interests is low and the complexity of the relationship can be dealt with at a contractual level, the board can be provided with a stable set of goals and guidelines that can be communicated to the managers and used to evaluate their proposals. If the heterogeneity of interests and the complexity of the relationships are high, then the board is likely to be more involved in dealing with the "political" implications of strategic decisions even at a corporate or business level. Finally, the heterogeneity of shareholders' interests and the distribution of relevant knowledge seem to affect the extent of board involvement in the different phases of the decision-making process. If heterogeneity of interests is high or shareholders possess knowledge and capabilities relevant to the strategic issues, the board tends to show a higher involvement in all the steps of the decision process (see table 6 for a summary).
Combining evidence from our study with the strategy literature adopting a political view of the decision making process (Hickson et al., 1986; Pettigrew, 1973 Pettigrew, , 1978 , we have suggested an expansion of the traditional framework used to describe and analyze boards' behavior. We have argued that the board can be seen primarily as a decision-making body, where represented actors are in a particularly favorable position to influence the decision process, in order to safeguard their own interests. As such, it is mainly in the board of directors that a compromise between the conflicting goals of the represented stakeholders is reached. In this sense, the board of directors participates in the political dimension of the strategic decision process not only as a single monolithic entity interacting with top managers, but also as a negotiation forum where an agreement between major shareholders is to be reached before confronting the management. We believe that, despite the peculiarity of the sample and the national context, our findings may help management scholars to interpret the relationship between ownership structure and board dynamics in a more general setting, and to shed light on the relationship among ownership structure and boards of directors also in other corporate forms and in other national contexts. Firms, like the ones we studied, governed by a coalition of shareholders none of whom controls the majority of the capital, are common in countries like Germany, France, Japan, and others. Even in the United States, the ownership structure of many large companies tends to include today a variable and dynamic proportion of different subjects such as employees, top managers, banks, institutional investors, government, firms, families, etc. (Charkham, 1994; Monks & Minow, 1995; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) . Our findings suggest that a change of perspective may help management scholars to make sense of how a mix of shareholders with diverging interests and distributed competencies affect board dynamics, i.e. the key functions performed, the involvement in the strategic decision process and the decision mode used. We believe that, if we want to develop new conceptual frameworks and normative prescriptions useful also for corporate forms different from the typical anglo-saxon public company, corporate governance studies should be extended beyond the usual "Fortune 500" sample. To some extent, governance issues are not only specific to the national context, but they also vary according to the specific corporate form analysed. Governance issues in family-owned companies, for instance, or large co-operatives seem to be in part different than in the large public corporations that have been the privileged object of inquiry of American scholars. For this reason model and processes developed for public corporation could not be very useful in the analysis of family-owned companies or co-operatives. Extending governance studies beyond the usual "Fortune 500" sample may stimulate the development of conceptual frameworks and normative prescriptions that acknowledge differences in ownership patterns. Adopting an alternative conceptual and methodological approach to those that dominate the American literature might help to develop a more appropriate perspective to understanding the more complex European corporate environment.
We are strongly convinced that more extensive research on the relationships between ownership structure, board functions and strategy making is needed. In order to develop more robust propositions, our study should be replicated for other corporate form and a cross-analysis of board functions, role in strategy making, and decision mechanisms should be conducted. The replication on a broader scale and across several different forms could surface other variables whose influence on board dynamics is even greater. Anecdotal observations in the course of our research suggest that variables like the access to critical resources ( Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the degree of institutionalization of the environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) may have a considerable impact on the board's functioning and role. A further evidence from our study suggests that ownership structure may be considered a multi-dimensional construct, whose different aspects (degree of concentration, heterogeneity of interests, etc.) influence the board's functions in different ways. Future research could aim at the construction of a grounded theoretical model that connects different aspects of ownership structure with the main functions of the board. Relationships between ownership patterns and prevalent functions should then be tested and, if validated, could be used to develop a sort of contingency approach to corporate governance based on normative propositions regarding board composition and powers that take into account, among other variables, also the requisites of the ownership structure. 
